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Alan J. Auerbach, Laurence J. Kotlikoff, 
and Willi Leibfritz 
Generational accounting is a method of long-term fiscal analysis and planning 
(see Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff  1991; Kotlikoff  1992). Its goals are 
to assess the sustainability of fiscal policy and to measure the fiscal burdens 
facing current and future generations. Although  generational accounting is 
only eight years old, there are now 22 countries around the world doing gen- 
erational accounting: Argentina, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, the United King- 
dom, and the United States. Chile, Israel, and Mexico may soon be added to 
this list. 
Much of  this generational accounting has been done by  or in conjunction 
with governmental bodies including the Argentine Ministry of  Planning; the 
Bank of England, the Bank of Japan; the Board of Governors of  the Federal 
Reserve System, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Office of Manage- 
ment and Budget of the U.S. Government; the New Zealand Treasury; and the 
Norwegian Ministry of Finance. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has 
constructed generational accounts for France and Sweden. The World Bank 
has constructed generational accounts for Thailand and is about to begin con- 
structing generational accounts for Slovenia. In  addition, the Congressional 
Budget Office, the European Commission, and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) have each produced detailed studies 
of  generational accounting (see Sturrock 1995; Leibfritz et al. 1995; Raffel- 
huschen 1997). 
Alan .I.  Auerbach is the Robert D. Burch Professor of Economics and Law at the University of 
California, Berkeley, and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Lau- 
rence J. Kotlikoff is professor of economics at Boston University and a research associate of the 
National Bureau of Economic Research. Willi Leibfritz is head of the Department for Macroeco- 
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Generational accounting has also received its fair share of academic scrutiny 
(see Haveman  1994; Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff  1994; Buiter 1997; 
Cutler 1993; Diamond 1996; Kotlikoff 1997). Its methodology has been de- 
bated in leading economics journals, including the Journal of  Economic Per- 
spectives, the National  Tax Journal, and the Economic Journal. This debate 
has stimulated ongoing research, some of which is discussed here, on general 
equilibrium effects, immigration, and the proper way to discount government 
receipts and payments in light of  their uncertainty. Finally, generational ac- 
counting has received a fair amount of public attention. Its findings have been 
discussed in leading newspapers, magazines, and television news shows in 
many of the countries for which the accounts have been prepared. 
The growing interest in generational accounting is stimulated by  the rapid 
population aging taking place in virtually all the developed world and in much 
of the developing world. This demographic transition portends enormous fiscal 
bills in the first half of the next century as those generations born since World 
War I1 retire and begin collecting social security pension and old-age health 
care benefits. The tremendous size of this fiscal liability, its dire implications 
for our children, and its independence from the traditional deficit is leading 
economists, government officials, and the press to search for a meaningful 
measure of our fiscal future. 
How It Works and What It Does 
Generational accounting is based on the government’s intertemporal budget 
constraint, which requires that either current or future generations pay the gov- 
ernment’s bills-the  present value of  the government’s projected future pur- 
chases of  goods and services plus its official net  financial liabilities. Sub- 
tracting from these bills the present value of projected future net tax payments 
of current generations gives the present value net tax burden facing future gen- 
erations implied by current policy. Net tax payments are taxes paid less social 
security, welfare, and other transfer payments received.’ 
By comparing the growth-adjusted lifetime net tax burden facing members 
of future generations with that facing current newborns (who are assumed to 
pay, over their lifetimes, only the net taxes implied by current policy), one can 
assess the sustainability of current fiscal policies. For example, if the growth- 
adjusted lifetime net tax burden facing future generations is higher than that 
facing newborns, maintaining current policy through time, which means taxing 
members of successive new generations at the same rate as members of current 
generations, is not sustainable because it will not suffice to pay  the govern- 
ment’s bills. 
1. The fact that the government’s bills left unpaid by current generations must be paid by future 
generations does not mean that future generations must pay off (retire) official government debt 
at some finite future date. They do, however, have to service the debt. 3  Introduction 
Besides comparing the lifetime tax burdens facing members of future gener- 
ations with that of newborns, generational accounting calculates the present 
value changes in net taxes of generations, both living and future, resulting from 
changes in fiscal policies. Take an expansion of pay-as-you-go-financed social 
security retirement benefits. Generational accounting shows that this policy 
helps the current elderly and harms current younger and future generations. 
Specifically, it records the reduction in the present value net tax payments of 
older generations arising under the policy as well as the increase in the per 
capita present value net tax payments of young and future generations (whose 
increased payroll taxes have a larger present value than do their increased so- 
cial security retirement benefits).* 
Finally, generational accounting can identify the set of sustainable policies 
available to the government. For example, generational accounting can calcu- 
late the immediate and permanent annual percentage increase in income tax 
revenues (relative to the baseline projected time path of these revenues) needed 
to achieve intertemporal budget balance. This calculation takes the govern- 
ment’s  projected expenditures and other tax receipts as given and asks: By 
what percentage would one need immediately and permanently to raise income 
taxes so as to be able (in conjunction with other tax receipts) to pay for the 
government’s projected future expenditures and its current net financial liabili- 
ties and never have to raise taxes again? 
In forming its calculations, generational accounting considers not only the 
course of future policy but also the future demographic structure of the econ- 
omy. Projected population totals of currently living generations are a key ele- 
ment in determining the contribution of current generations in paying the gov- 
ernment’s bills.  Projected population totals of  future generations are a key 
element in determining how large will be the burden per future person of cov- 
ering the bills left unpaid by those now alive. 
This Book’s Agenda 
This book brings together the latest generational accounting results for 17 
of the 22 countries listed above: Argentina,  Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, New  Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden, Thailand, Japan, Portugal, and the United  state^.^ The results are pre- 
sented in separate chapters, one for each country, but they are also summarized 
and compared in chapter 4. Chapters 1,2,  and 3 set the stage for these analyses. 
Chapter 1  discusses the severe limitations of traditional fiscal analysis, namely, 
deficit accounting. Chapter 2 describes the method of generational accounting, 
and chapter 3  uses  a simulation model to consider how  well  generational 
2. This statement assumes that the return to capital exceeds the growth rate of the economy. 
3. Unfortunately, accounts for the other countries were not completed in time for inclusion in 
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accounting approximates policy-induced changes in generations’ true fiscal 
burdens. 
Chapter 1 provides the main motivation for generational accounting4-the 
deficit, at its core, is an arbitrary measure. Rather than measure a county’s fis- 
cal position, the deficit, in fact, need bear no fundamental relationship to fis- 
cal policy but, instead, simply reflects the government’s choice of how to la- 
bel its receipts and payments. Chapter 1 drives home this point using a series 
of models that incorporate intergenerational  redistribution by the government, 
uncertainty, economic distortions, and liquidity constraints. These models are 
stylized. But the point they make would hold in  any neoclassical economic 
model with rational economic agents and institutions: Regardless of their true 
fiscal policies, governments can label their policies so as to report any time 
path of deficits or surpluses they want. 
The fundamental problem with deficit accounting is that the deficit does not 
represent the answer to a well-posed economic question. Generational ac- 
counting, in contrast, attempts to answer two well-defined economic questions. 
First, what is the magnitude of the fiscal burden being left to future generations 
by  current policy, and second, how does a change in fiscal policy alter the 
intergenerational  distribution of welfare? In short, generational accounting at- 
tempts to understand the generational incidence (distribution of  burdens) of 
fiscal policy changes. In so doing, it incorporates a set of incidence assump- 
tions that will not, in general, capture the full range of either microeconomic 
or  macroeconomic responses to policy changes. Consequently, generational 
accounting should be viewed as a method of approximating  the policy-induced 
welfare changes experienced by different generations. 
How well do changes in generational accounts succeed in  approximating 
true generation-specific fiscal burdens? Hans Fehr and Laurence Kotlikoff ad- 
dress this question in chapter 3 with the help of the Auerbach-Kotlikoff dy- 
namic life cycle model. Their approach is to simulate various fiscal policies 
that produce substantial intergenerational welfare changes. They then use the 
simulated data to form changes in generational accounts according to the meth- 
odology detailed in chapter 2. Finally, they compare these generational account 
changes with the exact welfare changes arising in the model. They conclude 
that generational accounting does a pretty good job in approximating actual 
welfare changes particularly in the case of policies that do not involve substan- 
tial changes in the structure of economic incentives. 
Country Studies 
The country studies, which appear in chapters 5 through 21, have a common 
structure. They each begin with a description of recent domestic fiscal policy, 
4. Chapter  1  was originally published in  1993 in the Journal of Economics  (suppl. 7, 17-41) 
under the same title and is reprinted here with the permission of the publisher. 5  Introduction 
present (in 1995 dollars) generational accounts for 1995, discuss the genera- 
tional impact of recent or pending policies, and then consider alternative ways 
to restore generational balance. The 30 economists who produced these studies 
hail from all comers of the globe. They are almost equally divided between 
academic economists and economists working for central banks, treasuries, 
ministries of finance, or international economic institutions. A number of the 
country studies represent collaborations between the two types of economists, 
but all of the studies owe a significant debt to their respective governments for 
providing critically important data. 
The studies reveal very substantial and very troubling generational imbal- 
ances in the majority of  the 17 countries. The countries with extreme imbal- 
ances are Japan, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and Brazil. In these five coun- 
tries, future generations face fiscal burdens that are at least 75 percent higher 
than those of current generations when these burdens are measured as a per- 
centage of lifetime labor  earning^.^ In Japan and Italy, future generations face 
burdens that are more than twice those facing current generations. Another 
five countries have  severe imbalance-the  United States, Norway, Portugal, 
Argentina, and Belgium. In these countries, the growth-adjusted fiscal burdens 
facing future generations are 50 to 75 percent larger than those of current new- 
borns. Three countries-Australia,  Denmark, and France-have  substantial 
imbalances that leave their descendents facing 30 to 50 percent higher lifetime 
net tax rates. Canada appears to be essentially in generational balance. The 
remaining three countries-New  Zealand, Thailand, and Sweden-have  nega- 
tive imbalances; that is, their policies, if maintained, would leave future genera- 
tions facing lower lifetime net tax rates than current newborns. 
In measuring the fiscal burdens facing future generations or, more precisely, 
the net taxes (taxes paid less transfer payments received) facing future genera- 
tions, the baseline generational accounts assume no change in either the net 
taxes to be paid by  current generations over the rest of  their lives or  in the 
future course of government purchases of goods and services. Alternative as- 
sumptions can be and are entertained in this volume. Specifically, we consider 
the immediate and permanent tax hikes, transfer cuts, or spending cuts needed 
to achieve generational balance-a  situation in which future generations face 
no higher rate of lifetime net taxation than do those who have recently been 
born. These alternative characterizations of generational imbalances deliver a 
complementary message, namely, that in countries with large generational im- 
balances, very major policy changes are needed to achieve balance. 
Take, as an example, a policy of immediately and permanently cutting gov- 
ernment spending (purchases of goods and services) to achieve generational 
balance. In Japan, this policy would entail a 26 percent reduction in govern- 
5. The cross-country comparisons of  generational accounts in this chapter are based on the 
results arising from treating educational expenditures as a government purchase rather than a trans- 
fer payment. As indicated in chapter 5, treating educational expenditures  as transfer payments 
generates even larger imbalances than those mentioned here. 6  Alan J. Auerbach, Laurence J. Kotlikoff, and Willi Leibfritz 
ment purchases this year and every year into the future. In the United States, 
roughly a 19 percent reduction is needed, whereas Italy would have to cut its 
purchases by  roughly 53 percent! Proposing such tremendous fiscal adjust- 
ments would, presumably, frighten even the most courageous and generation- 
ally altruistic politicians. But those politicians who hesitate to act are con- 
demning their nations to more severe fiscal stringency in the future. This is 
one of the hard lessons of  generational accounting: the longer one waits, the 
larger the adjustment needed to achieve generational balance. 
Is official government debt primarily responsible for the generational imbal- 
ances reported here? The answer, in general, is no. The real culprit in most of 
the countries with imbalances is the interaction of their population aging with 
their large and growing transfer payments to the elderly in the form of pension 
payments and health care expenditures. The United States is a case in point. 
Its baseline generational accounts, which treat government education as a form 
of  spending, show future Americans facing lifetime net tax rates that are 51 
percent higher than those facing current American newborns. If the U.S. fed- 
eral debt were miraculously and instantaneously paid off by,  say, a philan- 
thropic Martian, future Americans would still face 30 percent higher net tax 
rates. On the other hand, were the United States able to stop aging, the rate of 
net taxation of future Americans would actually be 3 percent smaller! 
Whither Generational Accounting? 
Generational accounting is clearly catching on and appears to be influencing 
a growing number of policy debates. But will it ultimately replace deficit ac- 
counting as our central gauge of  a nation’s fiscal behavior? It is hard to say. 
The decision to use generational accounting is not just an intellectual one. It 
also involves political considerations, some of which militate against genera- 
tional accounting. But the decision also involves ethical considerations, which 
have a power of their own. Generational accounting makes us look ahead. It 
makes us refine our long-term fiscal projections. It makes us consider the rising 
cost of policy procrastination. It makes us ask tough questions about who will 
pay the government’s bills. It makes us address economic issues, rather than 
play accounting games. And it makes us acknowledge the extent to which we 
are expropriating our children’s resources by accumulating fiscal liabilities, be 
they implicit or explicit. 
Whether or not generational accounting replaces deficit accounting, the pa- 
pers collected here make one thing clear: serious discussion of a country’s gen- 
erational policy necessitates producing a set of generational accounts and using 
these  accounts to consider the generational impact of  alternative policies. 
Moreover, keeping track of changes over time in a country’s generational pol- 
icy requires doing generational accounting on an ongoing basis. This is where 
involvement by  governments and international economic institutions, such as 
the European Union, the OECD, the IMF, the World Bank, the Inter-American 7  Introduction 
Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank, is crucial. These enti- 
ties have the manpower and other resources needed to ensure that accurate and 
up-to-date generational accounting is done and done routinely. In addition to 
the means, governments and quasi-governmental entities bear a responsibility 
to do  generational accounting for one simple but very good reason: they repre- 
sent the collective guardians of our children’s economic futures. 
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